From the Major General: C. Neil Beer, PhD
THE MILITARY DISSIDENT ISSUE
The Fort Hood murders highlight a serious problem that exists throughout our military forces. Following the massacre of soldiers by Major Hasan there have been numerous well-meaning suggestions, such as:
.........Screening prior to enlistment or commissioning to eliminate mental health problems.
.........In a volunteer force elimination of dissidents should be no problem.
.........Give commanders the authority to eliminate problem or inadequate personnel.
The real solution is more complex but can be simply stated – provide everyone in uniform:
......(1) the ability to recognize dissident behavior, and
......(2) a guaranteed non-attribution channel to report it.
The military Services would probably argue that they already do this through mandatory lectures and seminars. But this time-tested traditional approach does not convey the necessary in-depth immersion and cultural exchanges to ensure that information is transferred and knowledge gained.
The 4 star Chief of Staff of the Army was on the right track when he said publicly at Ft Hood that he hoped this tragedy would not damage diversity. His intuition was sound, but the words were confusing and his understanding (not surprisingly) inadequate.
In order to give our military the ability to recognize dissident behavior, a goal more difficult to achieve than establishing non-attribution reporting channels, we will need cultural training programs developed & focused on teaching the ethnic and religious differences among our military personnel, to provide a cultural basis for identifying normal and abnormal behavior.
Presently our soldiers have no foundation for recognizing instances of suspicious behavior. We need to adopt the higher education model now implemented at several leading colleges and universities to educate students on the cultural beliefs and tenets of the world religions, eg, Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Jewish, Christian, etc. Schools such as USC, Johns Hopkins, and Penn State have established inter-faith centers which promote the presentation & exchange of sectarian beliefs among students.
The U.S. military must now ‘make room’ for a practical and broadened approach to the identification and understanding of personal beliefs & cultural differences, to enable soldiers to recognize dissident behavior.
The lead for this major part of the solution must be shouldered by the Chaplaincy within the military Services, giving the Chaplaincy the responsibility to establish a baseline of understanding through detailed collaboration with religious leaders and institutions for every tradition. The needed baseline, developed in consultation with subject matter experts, would be updated as changes occur and would be shared with all military members through a model program similar to the one described above. However, to assign the initial responsibility first requires the Chaplaincy to be structured differently than exists today.
Presently the military only requires its chaplains to be accredited within their own religious organizations. Their knowledge is therefore limited to their own tradition, thereby preventing the ability to assess other chaplains’ views and behavior with colleagues, or to consult with higher ranking chaplains ‘up the chain’. Thus, the current structure prevents the identification of rogue chaplains, as well as the identification of dissident behavior, because military chaplains (at all levels) today have very limited knowledge of the tenets followed by chaplains of different faiths.
As an example, in the case of Maj Hasan, a U.S. Army Imam chaplain of the same radical Muslim sect as Hasan may not have regarded his behavior as that of a dissident. Therefore, it will take broadened education in world religions, an increased understanding by all chaplains, and augmentation of the Chaplaincy with subject area experts in world religions, to provide a channel for military personnel also trained in observing radical behavior, and would certainly have provided a channel for soldiers and co-workers observing Hasan’s radical behavior.
In regard to a guaranteed non-attribution channel, when the above program is satisfactorily operating in steady-state, there will be numerous opportunities for debate/discussion and several channels set up for informed reporting. The newly informed chain-of-command, complemented by a cooperative & knowledgeable Chaplaincy, would be adequate from the start. In fact, if the program described herein is implemented, dissident behavior will be identified and corrected, or the offending parties will be weeded-out through several existing means. Tragedies like the one perpetrated by Maj Hasan would not likely repeat.
C. Neil Beer, PhD
MajGen, USAF (ret)
